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a limited partnership, 
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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 860314-CA 
John Michael Coombs, Esq. #3639 
72 East 400 South, Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-0833 
Leonard W. Burningham, Esq. #G506 
47 West 200 South, Suite 460 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7411 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Okland Ltd., Inc. 
Appeal from a Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge Presiding 
(District Court No. C87-2941) 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals and since fourteen (14) days have not passed since the 
entry of this court's Decision on February 10, 1988, Appellant 
Okland Ltd., Inc., hereby petitions the Utah Court of Appeals 
for a rehearing in the above entitled matter. A copy of this 
Court's February 10, 1988, Decision is attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference as Petitioner's Exhibit "A". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT'S FEBRUARY 10, 1988, DECISION IS ERROR IN THAT THE 
ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AGREEMENT IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS 
A PENALTY OR OTHERWISE CONTAINED UNCONSCIONABLE LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES PROVISIONS WAS IN FACT BEFORE THE LOWER COURT IN 
APPELLANT'S MAY 15, 1985, OPPOSING MEMORANDUM. THE LOWER 
COURT AND THIS COURT HAVE THUS FAILED TO ADDRESS THIS 
ISSUE PROPERLY BEFORE BOTH COURTS. 
Page 6 of this Court's February 10, 1988, Decision under 
the heading "Alternative Remedy" states that whether the 
agreement was void as a matter of law and unenforceable as a 
penalty was not raised before the trial court and cannot be con-
sidered for the first time on appeal. (See Exhibit "A" hereto.) 
In point of fact this issue was indeed raised in the lower court 
in Appellant/Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 15, 1985, a copy of which 
is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Petitioner's 
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Exhibit "B" and which is part of the lower court's record. 
Under the heading therein entitled "Genuine Issues of Fact for 
Trial Precluding Summary Judgment for Plaintiff", page 6, 
Appellant/Defendant stated the following as an issue of fact: 
"Whether the provision in the purported 'lease' 
agreement providing that upon a default, lessees are liable 
for the balance of the 'lease' payments is a reasonable or 
unconscionable liquidated damages clause." [Emphasis added.] 
It is clear that the issue of whether the agreement was 
unenforceable as a penalty and contained unreasonable liquidated 
damages provisions providing for an unconscionable acceleration 
of the balance, was in fact before the trial court. While not 
having been addressed by the trial court, such issue was further 
not addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals in its February 10, 
1988, Decision. Such is error, particularly when according to 
Appellant's Brief, Respondent First Security Financial may have 
actual damages of merely $1,800 and Appellant Okland may now be 
subject to damages and penalties, including acceleration and 
interest, of nearly $50,000.00, or approximately 28 times 
Plaintiff/Respondent's actual damages. This includes the trial 
court's erroneous award of unaccrued interest on "lease" 
payments that were not yet due and owing, as approximately 2 ^ 
years remained on the purported 5-year "lease" at the time of 
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the alleged default. Such an overall accelerated award and 
windfall to First Security Financial is unconscionable and a 
burlesque upon justice particularly when First Security neither 
proved nor calculated its damages nor demonstrated any evidence 
of how it indeed calculated or was able to calculate such, par-
ticularly when it was an alleged assignee of the agreement and 
had few records or documents in its files which it received from 
Murray First Thrift, its purported assignor. (See Point 2 of 
Appellant's Brief, on file herein, pages 29-35 and cases cited 
therein.) 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IN FACT ASSERTED DEFENSES UNDER ARTICLE 9 IN 
ITS AMENDED ANSWER IN THE LOWER COURT AND THEREFORE THE 
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN BASING ITS FEBRUARY 10 DECISION 
ON APPELLANT'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO DO SO. 
The first full paragraph of page 6 of the Court of Appeals 
February 10, 1988, Decision states: 
"Furthermore, Okland has not asserted any specific 
defenses or counterclaims as a debtor under Article 9. 
Given that failure it makes no difference if the contract 
at issue is either a lease or a sales agreement." [See 
Exhibit "A" hereto.] 
On the contrary, Appellant Okland stated as an affirmative 
defense in its Amended Answer dated September 9, 1985, on file 
with the trial court, paragraph 12, page 3 therein, that 
"Plaintiff's claims were barred by the fact that the agreement 
between the parties involves a security interest governed by 
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Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code." [See A.9; R.191 of 
Appellant's Brief incorporated herein by reference.] For this 
reason the Court's decision is in error as Okland clearly and in 
fact asserted Article 9 defenses and such was unequivocally 
before this and the lower court. 
POINT III 
THE FEBRUARY 10 DECISION OF THIS COURT IS IMPOSSIBLE 
TO RECONCILE WITH THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN 
COLONIAL LEASING COMPANY OF NEW ENGLAND, INC. v. LARSON 
BROS. CONST. CO., 731 P.2d 483, (Utah 1986) AS CLEARLY 
CONTEMPLATED IN UTAH SUPREME COURT RULE 43(2). (A 
copy of the Colonial Decision is attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference as Petitioner's Exhibit WC".) 
Just because the equipment in this case was not repossessed 
by the secured party nor that it made any attempt to mitigate 
its damages, by even trying to locate the equipment, it does not 
follow that whether the agreement was a "lease", security 
agreement, installment, or collateral sales contract is not an 
issue of fact. Repossession of collateral itself is irrelevant 
and was irrelevant in Colonial Leasing as Justice Stewart stated 
therein: "The basic legal issue at stake here is whether the 
transaction was a lease or sale of the equipment." Justice 
Stewart, in reversing Judge Billings in Colonial, stated: 
"In granting Colonial's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the trial court ruled that the parol evidence of an option 
to buy was inadmissible, apparently because of the parol 
evidence rule and the statute of frauds." [Emphasis 
added.] Colonial, 49 Ut. Adv. Rpts. at 5. 
In the case at bar, Okland's Opposing Affidavit attests to 
an oral option to buy including other oral uderstandings as evi-
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denced in the record. This issue and its effect was not dealt 
with in the court's February 10 Decision. Justice Stewart went 
on to say in Colonial, 49 Ut. Adv. Rpts. at 7 the following: 
"Many of these factors [those intended to make it a 
security agreement] are present in this lease. Under the 
lease Larson was to select the equipment and choose what 
supplier Colonial would obtain it from. All warranties by 
Colonial were excluded. Larson was required to insure the 
crawler-loader in favor of Colonial and to pay all taxes. 
He also bore the risk of loss. The lease concerned 
default provisions governing acceleration and resale. 
The trial judge in this case did not address what these 
provisions indicated as to the intent of the parties or 
whether the terms were ambiguous, therefore necessitating 
the admission of parol evidence to ascertain the intent of 
the parties. [Emphasis added.] 
"....In any event, the agreement in this case, for an 
oral option, if any, is not inconsistent with the express 
terms of the agreement. Although no such admission has 
been made in the present case, appellant has alleged an 
oral option consistent with industry custom and trade in 
the affidavits, and that is sufficent to create an issue of 
fact. [Emphasis added.] 
"Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and 
unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a 
motion for summary judgment. Morris v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 1983). 
If the evidence as to the terms of an agreement is in 
conflict, the intent of the parties as to terms of the 
agreement is to be determined by a jury. Id*; Amjacs 
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 
1981). In sum, whether a lease was intended as security 
for a sale is a question to be determined on the facts of 
each case, as is the issue or whether the nature of the 
document raises questions of fact that preclude summary 
judgment.* FMA Financial Corp., 590 P.2d at 805." 
[Emphasis added.] 
The terms of the "lease" agreement in Colonial are iden-
tical to the "lease" in the case at bar. (See Exhibit "C" 
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hereto. ) The trial court in this case ruled as a matter of law 
that it made no difference what the agreement or intention of 
the parties was as to the agreement regardless of the oral 
option to purchase consistant with industry trade and custom and 
Okland's opposing affidavits, and in fact ruled/ without any 
evidence, that the equipment was "lost". This is patent error 
in derogation of Colonial. [See A.37; R.371 of Appellant's 
Brief.] The trial court further refused to allow any parol evi-
dence as to what the agreement between the parties was and its 
purpose, including but not limited to the effect of the oral 
option to purchase. Such includes the tax ramifications and who 
was to receive the various benefits. In paragraphs 16 and 17 of 
James G. Okland's Opposing Affidavit of record in the lower 
court [A. 26; R. 205 of Appellant's Brief], Mr. Okland attests 
to the existence of several oral understandings that were pur-
posely not in the written agreement. Therein Mr. Okland states: 
"16. In addition, there were oral understandings as to the 
'residual' on the Lease which are not contained in the 
lease, namely who would own the equipment upon expiration 
of the lease terms and conditions and what the unstated 
'residual' was or would be and upon what such was based. 
"17. Finally, the written lease does not contain several 
oral understandings as to investment tax credits, depre-
ciation, and other tax considerations and were purposely 
not put in the 'lease', including the 'residual', as it was 
my understanding that if these terms were written into the 
lease it would not be a 'lease' but another instrument 
more like a collateral sales agreement or security agreement 
which would more accurately reflect the understanding of 
the parties hereto." [See A.26; R. 205 of Appellant's Brief.] 
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This court's February 10, Decision is totally irrecon-
cilable with Colonial Leasing, supra, and stands for the erro-
neous proposition that a secured party would be stupid at best 
to tailor an agreement as anything but a "lease" and ever 
repossess its collateral or attempt to mitigate its damages 
under any circumstances. In this case, First Security made no 
attempt to mitigate its damages when it had been paid on the 
"lease" 21/2 years, long after Okland ceased having any involve-
ment in the project, when Okland had never made any payments, 
and Murray First Thrift and First Security knew such. At the 
time of default First Security and only First Security knew 
where the equipment was as it and only it knew who had been 
paying it. The Utah Supreme Court in Colonial stated clearly 
that a dispute as to what the agreement between the parties is 
and an oral option to purchase, both existent in this case, 
creates an issue of fact precluding summary judgment. Further 
Justice Stewart stated that parol evidence is admissible in all 
such circumstances as a matter of law to ascertain such. This, 
the trial failed to do, exactly as in Colonial. (Again, 
reference is made to Exhibit "C" hereto.) 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT HAS NOT REVIEWED THE RECORD AND THE LOWER 
COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT "IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE" 
TO APPELLANT, THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WAS GRANTED. 
On page 3 of this court's February 10, 1988, Decision, this 
court has purported to "review the facts and inferences in a 
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light most favorable to the losing party, and determine if the 
undisputed facts before the court establish First Security's 
right to judgment as a matter of law." Citing Atlas Corp. v, 
Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 255, 229 (Utah 1987). On the 
contrary the court has proceeded to "believe" First Security 
Financial's presentation of the "facts" and ignored the fact 
that the nature of the agreement and intent of the parties was 
never determined by the lower court, and that Okland had an 
oral option to purchase, all flying in the face of Colonial 
Leasing, supra. To be sure, Plaintiff First Security never 
proved its case or its damages with any competent evidence or 
even that it was the lawful assignee of the "lease", let alone 
that it mitigated its damages. In this regard, Judge Greenwood 
in Tripp v. Vaughn, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (December 2, 1987) 
recently ruled that a bank executive vice president's testimony 
regarding damages on a note was inadmissible hearsay. The same 
holds true for the affidavits of Messrs. Russell and Cummings 
submitted by Plaintiff in Support of First Security Financial's 
Motion for Summary Judgment in the lower court. This Court has 
a duty to review such self-serving affidavits and the record in 
"a light most favorable" to Defendant/Appellant Okland which it 
has abjectly failed to do. 
It is well settled in Utah that a summary judgment should 
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be granted only when it is clear from undisputed facts that the 
opposing party cannot prevail. Frisbee v. K & K Const. Co., 676 
P.2d 387 389 (Utah 1984). Again this includes reviewing facts 
and inferences in a light "most favorable" to the party against 
whom the summary judgment was granted. Durham v. Magretts, 571 
P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). Appellant contends that this court 
clearly failed to do so as a matter of law in rendering its 
February 10, 1988, Decision. Rule 56(e); Utah Farm Prod. Credit 
Ass'n. v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904, 905 (Utah 1987). 
POINT V 
REASONABLE MINDS WOULD DIFFER ON PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL'S SELF-SERVING AND HEARSAY 
CALCULATION OF ITS DAMAGES. BECAUSE SUCH IS NOT FOR A SUM 
CERTAIN (OF CALCULATION) A TRIAL OR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON 
THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES IS REQUIRED. 
Appellant has submitted that the damages unilaterally 
calculated by Respondent are not for a sum certain and therefore 
a trial or evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages is 
required. In Russell v. Martel, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that plaintiff's claims were not for a 
sum certain and therefore a hearing should have been conducted 
by the trial court to ascertain the amount of damages to which 
the plaintiffs are entitled. The court held that the trial 
court is not at liberty to deviate from such rules. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays for this court's vacating of its 
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February 10 Decision, and for reversal and remand of the trial 
court's decision. Appellant hereby further requests pursuant to 
Rule 35 for a written answer to this Petition so that it may be 
apprised of the commencement of its 30-day time period/ if 
necessary, for petitioning the Supreme Court for a Writ of 
Certiorari pursuant to Utah Supreme Court Rule 43(2). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of February, 1988. 
John/Michael Coombs 
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
In accordance with Rule 35, the undersigned as counsel to 
Appellant Okland Ltd., Inc., hereby certifies on his oath that 
this Petition is presented in good faith and not for delay or 
any other wrongful or unethical purpose or motive but based on a 
belief that this Court has egregiously erred in its February 10, 
1988 Decision. 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
Johry Michael Coombs 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this day of 
February, 1988. 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 
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My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of February, 1988, 
I delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Petition, Request for 
Answer, and Certification to Kyle W. Jones, Esq., Attorney for 
Respondent, 200 South Main, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101 and Leonard W. Burningham, Esq., Co-Counsel to Petitioner/ 
Appellant, 47 West 200 South, Suite 460, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—-—00O60 
First Security Financial/ 
a Utah corporation/ 
Plaintiff and Respondent/ 
v. 
Okland Ltd.# Inc., and 
Bradshaw-Ferrin Development 
Company/ now known as 
Bradshaw Development Co./ 
a Utah corporation/ 
Defendants and Appellant, 
v. 
Doug Bradshaw, Robert M. 
Simonsen, City Gate 
Condominium Partnership, 
a limited partnership/ and 
John Does 1-5, 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Okland Ltd./ Inc. (Okland) appeals from a summary 
judgment granted plaintiff/ First Security Financial (First 
Security)/ for Okland's breach of an equipment lease 
agreement. Okland claims on appeal that the trial court erred 
in granting the motion for summary judgment because geniune 
issues of material fact existed/ or, alternatively, the lease 
should be declared void as a penalty and the judgment reversed. 
On September 31, 1981/ Okland and Bradshaw-Ferrin 
Development Co. (BFDC) executed an equipment lease agreement as 
lessees/ agreeing to pay certain sums to Murray First Thrift 
(MFT)/ lessor/ for lease of personal property. MFT 
simultaneously purchased the property described in the lease 
a 
EXHIBIT 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Cas^ No. 860314-CA 
F I L E D 
FEB 10 1988 
Timoihy;... Shea 
Clark of ihe Court 
Ut£h Court c? Appeals 
A 
agreement from Okland and BFDC, as evidenced by a check and 
bill of sale. The lease provided for a term of sixty months, 
with monthly payments of $775.19. The lessees paid $1,550.38, 
representing first and last months' rent, on execution of the 
lease agreement. 
After the lessees had missed several payments under the 
lease agreement, First Security filed suit against Okland and 
BFDC on May 16, 1984, alleging that First Security was the 
successor in interest to MFT on the lease agreement, that the 
lease was in default, and that ib, should be granted judgment 
for amounts due under the lease and return of the equipment 
leased. Okland1s answer generally denied it had sufficient 
information to admit or deny the complaint's allegations. The 
answer further stated that Okland had acted in good faith in 
regard to the lease agreement and that First Security had 
failed to mitigate its damages. Okland also cross-claimed 
against Doug Bradshaw, a principal of BFDC, alleging that 
Okland had withdrawn from the project in which the leased 
equipment was to be used, that Doug Bradshaw had orally 
represented that Okland would not need to seek to be released 
by MFT from obligation on the lease agreement, and that Doug 
Bradshaw would hold Okland harmless from payment on the lease. 
First Security filed a motion for summary judgment against 
Okland and BFDC in April 1985, supported by an affidavit of 
attorney fees and an affidavit of a First Security officer, 
stating the amounts owed under the lease and that the lease 
attached to the complaint was identical to the one in First 
Security's files. Okland opposed the motion and filed an 
affidavit of Okland's counsel, stating that First Security's 
counsel had said that the lease was a "sale lease-back" and not 
a true lease. Okland also filed an affidavit of James Okland, 
president of Okland, stating that he could not obtain 
information to verify the accuracy of First Security's 
affidavits. Okland also sought additional time to conduct 
discovery. On May 17, 1985, the trial court granted First 
Security summary judgment against BFDC, which did not appear 
nor otherwise oppose the motion, and continued the hearing on 
the motion against Okland. 
In September 1985, First Security filed another affidavit 
executed by a First Security officer, asserting that the 
allegations of the complaint were true and setting forth 
various amounts owed under the lease agreement totalling 
$31,993.23. Okland filed an amended affidavit of James Okland 
stating that the lease did not reflect the parties' agreement 
and that First Security had not attempted to mitigate its 
damages by selling the leased property. Okland also filed a 
memorandum which claimed that material issues of fact existed 
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precluding granting of summary judgement. Those issues were: 
(1) whether the lease was a security agreement; and (2) the 
unavailability of documentation regarding the purchase price of 
the equipment. Okland also sought leave to amend its answer to 
the complaint. 
On September 9, 1985, the court granted Okland's motion to 
amend its answer. The amended answer alleged as affirmative 
defenses that plaintiff's claim was barred by failure of 
consideration and by the fact that the lease agreement was 
really a security agreement. On September 23, 1985, the court 
granted First Security's motion for summary judgment against 
Okland for $33,893.23 and found that there were no factual 
issues regarding whether the contract was a lease, security 
agreement or contract of guarantee and no evidence that First 
Security had failed to mitigate damages. 
I -
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
We first consider whether the trial court correctly granted 
First Security's motion for summary judgment against Okland. 
We will review the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and determine if the undisputed 
facts before the court establish First Security's right to 
judgment as a matter of law. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 
737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
Okland claims that there are two factual disputes 
precluding summary judgment: (1) the damages recoverable under 
the lease agreement; and (2) whether the lease agreement was 
actually a security agreement. 
A. 
We first address the question of damages recoverable under 
the agreement. First Security filed an affidavit in support of 
its motion for summary judgment signed by an officer of First 
Security. The affidavit states that the affiant is an officer 
of First Security and that he has access to its files and has 
personal knowledge of the matters set forth in the affidavit. 
The affidavit further avers that the equipment listed in the 
lease agreement was delivered to defendants and had not been 
repossessed by First Security. The affidavit concludes by 
itemizing amounts due under the lease for monthly payments, 
1984 and 1985 property taxes, late charges and interest accrued 
as of the date of the affidavit. A later affidavit of counsel 
set forth attorney fees sought by First Security. 
860314-CA 3 
An amended affidavit of James Okland, in opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment, states that, "to my knowledge," 
the first payment under the lease, which included the last 
month's rent, was not applied to reduce the balance owing under 
the lease. In addition, the affidavit claims that the affiant 
never received an accounting of application of payments made 
and that affiant "believe[s]H that the amount prayed for in the 
complaint is erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires that 
affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
"shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein." See also Utah Farm Prod. Credit 
Ass'n. v. Watts. 737 P.2d 154, 157 (Utah 1987). Mr. Okland's 
affidavit fails to comply with the rule's requirements. His 
belief that facts asserted by the opposition are erroneous is 
not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. In 
resisting a motion for summary judgment, "bare contentions, 
unsupported by any specifications of facts in support thereof, 
raise no material questions of fact." Briqham Truck & 
Implement Co. v. Fridal, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 11 (1987) (per 
curiam). The affidavit does not contain facts which would be 
admissible in evidence controverting First Security's affidavit 
as to amounts owed, but only the unsupported contention that 
First Security's calculations are*erroneous. 
We have also examined the lease agreement itself to 
determine if the damages included in the summary judgment were 
proper as a matter of law. We conclude that the lease 
agreement provides for each category of damages awarded. 
Okland claims that it was error for the court to award 
prejudgment interest on the unpaid balance of payments due 
under the lease. Okland misconstrues the interest award. The 
lease provides that upon default the lessor can accelerate 
payment and recover interest from the date of acceleration on 
the total amount outstanding. Therefore, the interest is not 
prejudgment interest but interest expressly payable under the 
terms of the contract. Okland also claims the late payment 
award was erroneous. However, the late charge is assessed upon 
the accelerated balance due under the contract, in accord with 
the terms of the contract, and is, therefore, recoverable in an 
action under the contract. 
B. 
Okland's second contention is that an issue of fact existed 
regarding whether the agreement is a true lease or a security 
agreement, precluding summary judgment. James Okland's 
affidavit stated that the actual agreement among MFT, Okland 
and BFDC, was for a "sale lease-back," with an option to 
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purchase the property for a nominal sum at the end of the lease 
term, Okland's memorandum in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment includes portions of a deposition of a former 
employee of MFT, which supports the assertion that the 
transaction was really intended as a secured sale# not a true 
lease. Okland cites Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. 
v. Larsen Bros. Constr., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), as 
controlling precedent. In Colonial Leasing, the trial court 
excluded parol evidence offered to prove that an ostensible 
lease agreement was actually intended to be a sales and 
security agreement subject to the provisions of Article 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. The Utah Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded, stating that "whether a lease was intended as 
security for a sale is a question to be determined on the facts 
of each case, as is the issue of whether the nature of the 
document raises questions of fact that preclude summary 
judgment." Id. at 488. Okland argues, therefore, that this 
case should be reversed and remanded for a factual 
determination of whether a security agreement was intended by 
the parties. However, the purpose of such a factual 
determination must be examined. In FMA Financial Corp. v. 
Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld a trial court's determination that a lease of personal 
property was actually a secured sale and, therefore, subject to 
the provisions of Article 9. The Court further found that 
plaintiff in that case had failed to properly comply with the 
default provisions of Article 9 and denied it a deficiency 
judgment. Plaintiff's breach consisted of a failure to dispose 
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. 
In this case, the putative secured party, First Security, 
did not repossess the -collateral*" prior to filing suit nor at 
any time during the proceedings before us. Furthermore, a 
secured party is not. required by Article 9 to liquidate 
collateral prior to pursuing other remedies. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-9-501 (1980) provides that a secured party's rights upon 
default are alternative. A secured party "has an option to 
pursue any of the parties liable on [a] note, which is secured 
solely by personal property, and may also, at its option, 
ignore that security and satisfy its judgment from other 
property in the hands of the judgment debtor." Kennedy v. Bank 
of Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881, 884 (Utah 1979). Therefore, First 
Security was within its rights, even as a secured creditor, in 
not repossessing and selling the "collateral," and then 
applying those proceeds to the debt. The cases cited by Okland 
all involve failure of a secured creditor to properly care for 
or dispose of collateral. However, the duties of a secured 
creditor to protect and properly sell collateral do not arise 
until the secured party has exercised its right to repossess 
the collateral. North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Sharpe, 35 N.C. 
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App. 404, 241 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1978). Since First Security did 
not repossess the equipment, it had no Article 9 duties 
regarding the equipment even if Article 9 applied. See Themy 
v. Seagull Enters., Inc.. 595 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah 1979) 
(summary judgment appropriate, even if facts in dispute, 
Mwhere, even according to the facts as contended by the losing 
party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law-). 
Furthermore, Okland has not asserted any specific defenses 
or counterclaims as a debtor under Article 9. Given that 
failure, it makes no difference if the contract at issue is 
viewed as a lease agreement or a sales agreement. The monthly 
payments required are either lease payments or installment 
sales payments. However denominated, monthly payments and any 
other damages designated in the contract as payable upon 
default, are recoverable as a basic matter of contract law in 
this case. Okland may not prevail on a defense theory which 
has not been pled or even articulated at any point in the 
proceedings. This Court has previously held, in affirming a 
summary judgment, that Ha judgment order must not only be 
supported by competent evidence, but the pleadings must allege 
applicable legal theories." Hendricks v. Interstate Homes. 
Inc., 745 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah App. 1987). 
Therefore, we find that the trial court correctly granted 
First Security summary judgment against Okland. 
II 
ALTERNATIVE REMEDY 
Okland maintains, alternatively, that even if otherwise 
appropriate, the trial court's judgment should be reversed and 
judgment entered in its favor, with this Court finding that the 
agreement is void as a matter of law and unenforceable as a 
penalty. We need not examine this argument as it was not 
raised before the trial court and cannot be considered for the 
first time on appeal. Travner v> Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 
(Utah 1984); James v. Preston, <746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 
1987). 
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The trial court's judgment is. affirmed. Costs are awarded 
to First Security. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCURL 
Gregory KT Orme, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OKLAND LTD. INC., and 
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, now known as 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT CO., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
OKLAND LTD., INC., 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSON, 
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PART-
NERSHIP, a limited partnership 
and JOHN DOES 1 - 5 , 
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— 1— CYU'T'T 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-84-2941 
Judqe Billinqs 
oooOooo 
Co-Defendant/Third-Plaintiff Okland Ltd. Inc., by and 
through its attorneys of record John Michael Coombs and E. Paul 
Wood respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment set for hearinq on 
Friday, May 17, 1985, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m. on the 
Law and Motion calendar of the Honorable Judith M. Billinqs and 
attaches hereto and incorporates by reference the affidavit of 
Okland Ltd., Inc. 
FACTS 
On September 30, 1981, Defendants executed a purported 
"equipment lease" with Murray First Thrift Leasinq, the 
apparent predecessor in interest to Plaintiff herein, the terms 
of which required payments on the part of Defendant lessees of 
$775.19 per month for a tdtal of 60 months or five years for 
total payment of $46,511.40 as the purported value of the 
"lease". At the time of enterinq the "lease" agreement it was 
Co-defendant/Thipd Party Plaintiff Okland Ltd.'s understanding 
that upon expiration of the "lease" and payment of all monthly 
"rentals'1 due and owinq under the agreement, that 
Defendant/Co-lessees would in fact own the equipment and retain 
title thereto or title would be transferred free and clear to 
them upon payment of a nominal residual fee. (See Affidavit of 
Okland Ltd., Inc. in support of this Memorandum.) 
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The purpose of Defendant/lessee1s entering the purported 
wlease" agreement was to provide model furniture for the pro-
posed model condominium at the Whilshire Condonimum project sub-
sequently built and located on 4th South and 10th East in Salt 
Lake City. It was anticipated that Okland Ltd. Inc., in conjunc-
tion with its construction company, would, in fact, construct The 
Wilshire, but soon after entering the "lease" agreement, 
Oklands, without prejudice to any party, removed themselves from 
participation in the venture. Okland Ltd. made no payments on 
the subject "lease" nor did they ever subsequently participate 
in the construction of The Wilshire. Co-defendant 
Bradshaw-Ferrin Development, now known as Bradshaw Development 
Company, and Third-Party Defendants Douglas C. Bradshaw, Bob 
Simonson, and City Gate Condominium Partnership apparently made 
all "lease" payments pursuant to the aqreement until the early 
part of 1984. Okland Ltd. Inc. received no benefit from the 
purported "lease" and James G. Okland was orally informed by 
Third-Party Defendant Douglas C. Bradshaw, principal of co-
defendant/lessee Bradshaw Development Company, that Okland Ltd. 
Inc. would essentially be indemnified from any liability on the 
subject "lease". (See Cross-Claim and Third Party Complaint on 
file herein and Affidavit of Okland Ltd. Inc. attached hereto 
and incorporated by reference.) 
Murray First Thrift Leasing, the apparent predecessor in 
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interest to Plaintiff, filed a UCC 1 Financing Statement with 
the State of Utah perfecting its security interest in the pur-
ported equipment subject to the "lease". It is noteworthy that 
the equipment subject hereto is not identified by either serial 
or model number and further there is no evidence that an 
acknowledgment of receipt of delivery of the property exists nor 
do copies of the invoices evidencing the actual purchase price 
of the equipment seem to be available. Copies of the financing 
statement documents filed by Plaintiff's predecessor, Murray 
First Thrift Leasing, are attached hereto and incorporated by 
reference as Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff Okland's Exhibits 
"A", "B" and "C". That copied of the original purchase price 
invoices and any acknowledgments of receipt of delivery of the 
specific equipment unidentified by serial or model number in the 
financinq statements do not exist or are u/iavailable are evi-
denced by the affidavit of John Michael Toombs attached hereto 
and further incorporated by reference. 
Based on the apparent default of co-lessees and third-party 
defendants, Plaintiff filed this action on May 16, 1984, and has 
failed to pursue the matter or conduct any discovery until the 
filing of its Motion for Summary Judgment one year later in 
which Plaintiff asks for 18% interest per annum on the balance 
of the "lease" from the date of Defendants' alleged default. 
Since having been given notice of Plaintiff's Motion for 
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nummary Judgment in April, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, 
Okland Ltd. Inc. has submitted to Plaintiff, Co-defendant, and 
Third Party Defendants various Reguests for Production of Docu-
ments, Reguests for Admission and Interrogatories and has 
further filed a Notice of Deposition of former Vice President of 
Murray First Thrift Leasing Robert M. Barr and has further sub-
mitted a Second Set of Interrogatories and Reguest for 
Production of Documents to Plaintiff as to other "leasing" 
agreements entered into by Murray First Thrift Leasing, 
demonstrating the intent of the parties and course of conduct of 
Plaintiff with regard to any such other "leases." 
It is Okland Ltd. Inc.'s understanding that the "lease" 
agreement was not a "lease" but a "security agreement" as 
defined and contemplated in 70A-1-207(37) of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code, and that the agreement, though purporting on 
its face to be a "lease" is in fact a "security agreement" 
governed by Articles 9 and 2 of Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
and furthermore that Plaintiff has failed to mitigate its dama-
ges, among other things, by failing to repossess the eguipment 
and take no action on the lawsuit for one year after its 
complaint was filed. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT FOR TRIAL PRECLUDING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF 
Whether it was the intention of the parties at the time of 
entering the "lease" agreement and pursuant to any modifications 
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of such that the agreement was in fact a "security agreement" 
aside from the self-serving declarations in the agreement 
itself. 
Whether the provision in the purported "lease" agreement 
providing that upon default, lessees are liable for the balance 
of the "lease" paymentsf is a reasonable or unconscionable 
liguidated damages clause. 
What the intention of the parties was at the time of 
entering the contract as to the useable life of the eguipment, 
the beneficiaries of the investment tax credit, who would own 
the eguipment upon expiration of the "lease", and on what terms, 
what the purchase price of the equipment wais in relation to the 
rental payments and whether the total "rental" payments exceed 
the perchase value of the eguipment. 
Whether the monthly payments under the alleged "lease" have 
been calculated to be returned to the leasing company include 
the purchase pricef sales tax and interest, etc. and therefore 
the agreement under the facts is one for security. 
Whether the unavailability or nonexistence of supporting 
documentation as to the purchase price of the equipment and 
Plaintiff's inabilitly to calculate its "actual" damages preclu-
des summary judgment for Plaintiff. 
Whether Okland Ltd., Inc. would be prejudiced by summary 
judgment and whether it is in the interests of justice and judi-
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cial economy under the one action rule to set the case for trial 
and resolve the respective liabilities amongst all parties 
together. 
Whether parol evidence is admiasable in thi&, c«#*MJ6rr 
demonstrate a waiver by plaintiff of purported "leaae1** eicec**-
tory provisions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED AS THERE ARE GENUINE 
ISSUES OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE PURPORTED "LEASE" IS 
A SECURITY AGREEMENT GOVERNED BY THE UCC ON THE BASIS 
OF THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES AND THE FACTS TO BE 
ADDUCED AT TRIAL. 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 70A-1-20K37) provides, in per-
tinent part as follows: 
"Whether a lease is intended as security is to be deter-
mined by the facts of each case; however (a) the inclusion 
of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease 
one intended for security and ~-.£b> an a$£$ement«|g|^ 
compliance with the terms of the lease the leasee";4dwll 
become or has the option to b«c«e the owwr of t l ^ m ^ 
perty for no additional conaid*ll*i'dil'or for nomina^^|n-
sideration does make the lease one intended for s^ c^ tttfr.11 
(Emphasis added.) 
Though the purported "lease" did not include an option to 
purchase and contained no provisions that upon compliance with 
the terms of the "lease" the lessees would become owners of the 
equipment or have the option to become the owners of the pro-
perty for no additional or nominal consideration, as set forth 
in the affidavit of James G. Okland, it was Defendant/Third 
Party Pgflintiff, Okland Ltd., Inc.'s understanding that lessees 
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would become the owners of the equipment if they desired for 
either no additional consideration or nominal consideration and 
therefore, the lease was one intended for security. Arnold 
Machinery Co. v. Balls, Utah, 624 P.2d 678, 680 (1981)? I.C. 
Bender's Uniform Commercial Code, §29A.05(1)(d). 
In FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, Utah, 590 P.2d 803 
(1979) the Supreme Court of Utah ruled that^*|fgp|^ 
treated as a security interest where only nominal consideration 
is necessary to exercise an option to pur*ftase. In that case 
the Court proposed three tests to analyze whether the purchase 
option contained in the lease may be deemed a security interest: 
(1) compare the option price with the oriqinal list price or 
cost price of the property; (2) compare the option price with 
"sensible alternatives" and (3) compare the option price to the 
fair market value of the property at the time the option is to 
be exercised. Arnold Machinery Company, supra, at 680. In 
the case at bar, based on the Affidavit of James G. 
Okland, the lessees had the option to become owners of the pro-
perty for little or no consideration. Judginq from the record, 
there is insufficient evidence to apply the Court's three-
pronged test in FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers and in 
order to apply these tests facts are necessary to be adduced at 
trial thereby precludinq summary judgment for Plaintiff. 
In the case of Western Enterprises vs. Arctic Office 
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Machinery, 667 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1983) the Court held that 
defining when a security interest consistent with the purchase 
and sell agreement is created by a purported lease, nominality 
of an option price contained in the purported lease is only one 
of the indicia of whether the transaction is a lease or purchase 
agreement. The Court further held that finding that the option 
price is nominal would conclusively establish that the transac-
tion is a conditional sales agreement, but the fact that the 
option price is not nominal does not foreclose construing the 
purported lease as a purchase agreement. Western Enterprises, 
supra at 1235• 
In Centurian Corporation v. Cripps, 624 P.2d 706, 709, (1981) the 
Supreme Court of Utah held that when a transaction purports on 
its face to be a lease, but is in fact a sale with reservation 
of a security interest in vendor, it becomes subject to law of 
sales. U.C.A. 1953, 70A-1-20K37). In the case at bar 
Plaintiff's predecessor filed UCC-1 financing statements with the 
State of Utah evidencing reservation of a security interest in 
them. (See Exhibits HA", "B", and "C" attached hereto.) 
In Leasing Service Corp. v. Nat* Bank & Trust Co. (1976, F 
DC NJ) 19 UCCRS 252 (applying New Jersey Code), it was held the 
degree by which the total rentals exceeded the purchase value 
of the eguipment compelled the conclusion that no residual 
proprietary rights were contemplated by the lessor at the end of 
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the 5-year term and that the leases were intended as security 
within the meaninq of S1-20K37) of the UCC. Most, though not 
all of the terms and conditions of the form leases at issue in 
the present case support the conclusion that these transactions 
were conditional sales, not true leases, the court dclared. The 
absence of an option to purchase did not require a contrary 
conclusion, the court said, pointing out that it was possible 
that the 5-year term closely approximated the ecoruMi^ IXtm ^ ^ 
the equipment, although the court conceded that the parties had 
presented no data concerning the anticipated useful life of the 
leased equpment. The court also noted other indicia of a con-
ditional sale in the leases, among which were the followinq: 
the requirement that the lessee provide insurance aqainst loss,, 
theft, damage, or destruction of the leased equipment in an 
amount not less than the total rent, the requirement that the 
lessee was to bear the entire risk of loss, theft, damaqe or 
destruction, and that no such loss would relieve the lessee of 
its obligation to pay rent, the requirement that the lessee hold 
the lessor harmless from all claims and liabilities arising in 
connection with the equipment, the requirement that the lessee pay 
all charges and taxes imposed upon the ownership, leasing, renting, 
sale, purchase, possessionf or use of the equipment, except 
taxes based on the lessor's net income, the requirement that the 
lessee pay a substantial deposit ("advance rent") upon accep-
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tance of the leases, the provision for acceleration of rental 
payments and the payment of attorney's fees by the lessee in the 
event of default, and a provision specifying the supplier of 
the equipment to be leased, suggesting that the lessor purchase 
this equipment specifically for lease to this lessee. 
In O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc» v. ^^^mCWtMt€Btlnc. 
91976, NY) 18 UCCRS 1342, it was held that leases of^equipment 
were in fact security transactions*within the meaning of §1-201 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the court pointing out that the 
total rentals for the lease term approximated the cost of the 
equipment plus interest, that the purchase was made by the lessor 
in specific response to the lessee9s order'and after the leases 
were signed, and were designed for the lessee's use and subject 
to model obsolescence and that the equipment would lose the most 
substantial portion of its value by the end of the leases. 
II. PAROL EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE THE 
EXISTENCE OF AN OPTION ON THE LEASED EQUIPMENT AND ITS 
EXISTENCE PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF 
In FMA Financial Corporation v. Pro-Printers, supra at 805, 
FMA asserted that because the written lease agreement made no 
mention of an option to purchase and contained an •'integration 
clause" stating that the written lease contained the entire 
agreement between the parties, defendant should not be allowed 
to vary the written terms with parol evidence of an option to 
purchase. The Court held, however, that "FMA's officers 
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admitted at trial that they offered lessees the option to purchase 
leased equipment as a matter of course in their business? thus 
renderinq the alleqed inteqration clause ineffective," and 
therefore parol evidence was admissible, FMA, supra, at 805, In 
the case at bar not only should trial be had to determine the 
intention of the parties, but to afford them the opportunity of 
proving that the "lease" was a secured sale and not a "true 
lease" . (Again, see Affid'av/iL of John MiiUdMl Coombs/) 
In Lease Finance Inc. v. Burger, 575 P.2d 857 (Colo* 1977), 
the Court held that parol evidence was admissible to show waiver 
of executory provisions of the sales contract. Lease Finance, 
supra at 857. In that case the Court further held that whether 
a transaction is characterized as a lease or sale is not conclu-
sive, but rather it is the intention of the parties which is 
controlling, that intention to be determined by facts of each 
case. Lease Finance, supra at 857. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment can be qranted only if the record shows 
that there is no qenuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judqment as a matter of law. 
Doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact 
must be construed in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. Litigants must be able to present 
their cases fully to the Court before judgment can be rendered 
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against them unless it is obvious from the evidence before the 
Court that the party opposing judgment can establish no riqht to 
recover. The trial court must not weigh evidence or credibi-
lity. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, 
Wright and Miles, Charted, 681 P.2d 1258, (Sup. Ct. 18633, 
04/72/84); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, (Sup. Ct. 18415 
12/13/83). 
Based on the above Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Okland 
Ltd., Inc. hereby respectfully urges the Court to deny 
Plaintiff's Motion for.Summary Judgment. 
DATED this / \ ""ciay of May, 1985] 
J&hrf Ri<fhael Coombs1 
i. Paul Wood 
Attorneys for Okland Ltd., Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
is /£*%k"i I hereby certify that on th  /* *Hay of May, 1985, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum to Steven D. Crawley, 
Attorney for Bradshaw Development Co., Doug Bradshaw, and City 
Gate Condominium Partnership, Suite 107, 2225 East 
Murray-Holladay Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117; Kyle W. 
Jones, Attorney for Plaintiff, 200 South Main, Suite 1000, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101; and Third-Party Defendant Bob Simonson, 
2091 East 4800 South, Salt Lake City Utah A4117, 
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STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff Colonial Leasing Company tfntnv 
ferred possession of a heavy piece of coasts 
uction equipment called a crawler-loader to: 
defendant Michael Ray Larsen pursuant to i 
document called a "lease/ Larsen defaulted 
on the payments required by that document 
and the plaintiff sued for damages. The trial 
court granted Colonial Leasing summary 
judgment on its claim for S27.716.I0, the 
amount due under the document, less the 
proceeds of a sale of the equipment after 
plaintiffs repossession, plus costs and atto-
rney fees. On appeal, Larsen argues thai the 
document was a security agreement subject to 
the filing requirements of Article 9 of till! 
Uniform Commercial Code. Since Colonial 
failed to comply with Article 9 requiremeflta 
in disposing of the collateral, Laraen cont-
ends that Colonial was therefore precluded 
from recovering a deficiency judgment. In 
granting summary judgment, the trial court 
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stated in a minute entry: "Affidavits are not 
admissible and are barred by statute/ We 
reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
On September 23, 1977, Larsen obtained 
the crawler-loader from Colonial on a 60-
month "lease." Colonial had purchased the 
loader from a supplier specifically for Larsen. 
The "lease" contains an integration clause 
and expressly requires return of the equip-
ment upon expiration of the lease term. In 
May, 1980, Larsen defaulted and the equip-
ment was repossessed and sold for $6,000. 
Larsen filed affidavits in opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment stating that at 
the time the "lease" was entered into, it was 
the trade, custom, and usage in the business 
to accord lessees an option to purchase leased 
equipment at the end of the lease for its resi-
dual value and that Colonial had orally 
granted Larsen an option to purchase at the 
end of the "lease period" for the residual 
value of the equipment of approximately 10 
percent. 
The basic legal issue at stake here is 
whether the transaction was a lease or a sale 
of the equipment. When a commercial trans-
action for the acquisition of equipment is in 
the form of a lease but in fact is intended to 
be a sale, the payments, even though called 
"lease payments," are legally considered 
installment payments on the purchase price. 
At the end of such a "lease," there is either a 
nominal payment required to exercise the 
option to purchase or a final payment which, 
although sizeable in relation to the value of 
the goods, leaves the lessee no economic alte-
rnative but to exercise the option. .See, e.g., 
In re Vaillancourt, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 748 (Bankr. D. Me. 19^0); In re 
Washington Processing Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 475 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 
1966). 
In granting Colonial's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court ruled that parol 
evidence of an option to buy was inadmiss-
ible, apparently because of the parol evidence 
rule and the statute of frauds. On appeal, 
Larsen claims that the trial court erred in 
ruling that Larsen's affidavits alleging the 
existence of an oral option to purchase the 
crawler-loader were inadmissible on the 
motion for summary judgment. Larsen also 
asserts that the terms of the lease itself indi-
cate that the parties really intended a sale and 
security arrangement rather than a lease. 
I. STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rule^ of Civil 
Procedure provides that affidavits in support 
of or opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment must set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence at trial Horton v. 
Black ham. 669 P.2d 85^ (Utah 1983). Colo-
For complete I (ah Code Annotations, 
nial claims that the Uniform Commercial 
Code, specifically U.C.A., 1953, §70A-2-
201(1) (1980 ed.), precludes evidence of an 
oral agreement between the parties. Section 
70A-2-201(l) states: 
Except as otherwise provided in this 
section a contract for the^sale of 
goods for the price of $500 or more is 
not enforceable by way of action or 
defense unless there is some writing 
sufficient to indicate that a contract 
for sale has been made between the 
parties and signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought 
or by his authorized agent or broker. 
Colonial relies on In re Financial Computer 
Systems, Inc., 474 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1973), 
a case virtually identical to this case, for the 
proposition that §70A-2-201(l) bars parol 
evidence intended to prove that an apparent 
lease transaction is in fact a sale. In that case, 
an equipment lessor tried to reclaim from the 
lessee's bankruptcy trustee two air conditio-
ning units which it had leased to the lessee. 
The trustee refused to turn over the units, 
claiming that the lease was in reality a secu-
rity agreement and void because the lessor 
had not filed a financing statement. At the 
referee's hearing, the trustee was allowed to 
present evidence of an oral option to purc-
hase the equipment at the end of the lease. 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, 
holding that admission of the oral evidence 
violated Cal. Comm. Code $2201(1) (West 
1964), which is; identical to §70A-2-201(l). 
The court, however, failed to consider the 
effect of Cal. Comm. Code §2102, which 
states that "this division [Article 2 of the 
U.C.C] applies to transactions in goods; it 
does not apply to any transaction which alth-
ough in the form of an unconditional cont-
ract to sell or [a] present sale is intended to 
operate only as a security transaction." Our 
code has a virtually identical provision, 
§70A-2-102, to the California provision. 
Whether the statute of frauds provision 
contained in §70A-2-201(i) applies, there-
fore, is directly dependent on whether this 
transaction v/as a lease or an "unconditional 
contract to sell or [a] present sale." The trial 
court in the instant case did not adjudicate 
what the true nature of this transaction was. 
Section 70A-2-201(l) is not the only 
statute of frauds which might apply to this 
case. U.C.A., 1953, §25-5-4 (1984 ed.) 
states: 
In the following cases every agree-
ment shall be void unless such agree-
ment, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith: (1) 
every agreement that by its terms is 
consult Code • Co's Annotatioo Service. 
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not to be performed within one year 
from the making thereof. 
Even if applicable generally to transactions of 
the type involved in this case, §25-5-4(1) 
does not exclude the oral evidence in this 
case. Statutes of frauds are intended to bar 
enforcement of certain agreements that the 
law requires to be memorialized in writing. 
E.g., Howell v. Inland Empire Paper Co., 28 
Wash. App. 494, 624 P.2d 739 (1981). But 
statutes of fraud do not prevent a party from 
proving the true nature of the agreement 
between the parties when that is what is at 
issue rather than enforceability. Golden v. 
Golden, 273 Or. 506, 510, 541 P.2d 1397, 
1399 (1975). See also Bennett Leasing Co. v. 
Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963). 
In accord with that rule, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-
Ingram Development Co., 642 F.2d 744 (5th 
Cir. 1981), held that oral evidence of an 
option was admissible to shed light on the 
nature of an agreement between the parties, 
and specifically to show that it was a sale. Id. 
at 746 n.5. Woods-Tucker also expressly 
disavowed the holding in In re Financial 
Computer Systems. See also Bennett Leasing 
Co., 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246, where this 
Court held that even though an unsigned 
automobile lease for a term of twenty-four 
months was unenforceable, that the underl-
ying oral agreement between the parties was 
admissible to show the rental value of the 
automobile in an action for quantum meruit. 
In this case, the statute of frauds did not 
bar Larsen from proving what the parties had 
intended, since Larsen sought only to obtain 
the protections of Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, not to enforce an unwri-
tten term of the contract. Nor was Colonial's 
action for a deficiency judgment on the lease 
payments an attempt to enforce the oral 
option against Larsen. 
II. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
The Parol Evidence Rule serves to exclude 
evidence of terms in addition to those in a 
written integrated agreement. "(T]he rule 
operates in the absence of fraud to exclude 
contemporaneous conversations, statements, 
or representations offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of an integra-
ted contract/ Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 
P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). See also Eie v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 
(Utah 1981); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 
28 Utah 2d 261, 266, 501 P.2d 266, 270 
(1972); Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 
Yale L.J. 603, 609 (1944). Because the parol 
evidence rule applies only if the writing was 
intended by the parties to represent the full 
and complete agreement of the parties, the 
trial court must first determine whether the 
writing was intended to be an integrated 
agreement. Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665; 
Eie, 638 P.2d at 1194; Bullfrog Marina, 28 
Utah 2d at 266, 501 P.2d at 270. In some 
cases, it will be necessary for a tria^judge to 
rule on the issue of integration as a prelimi-
nary or foundational matter. See HaJloran-
Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 
P. 342(1927). 
In this case, the trial judge did not expre-
ssly rule whether the purported lease was an 
integrated writing. Since the affidavits raise a 
factual issue as to whether the contract was in 
fact intended to be integrated, the trial judge 
will need to hear the evidence on that issue. 
Indeed, the need for parol evidence is also 
suggested by the nature and terms of the lease 
itself and the surrounding circumstances. 
Larsen also argues that the terms of the 
lease itself indicate that it was meant not as a 
true lease, but as a security agreement for the 
sale of the property. In some cases, such a 
judgment may be apparent from the face of 
the document, but in other cases, the basic 
nature of the agreement, judging solely from 
its contents, may be ambiguous. It is the 
general rule that if an agreement is ambig-
uous because of lack of clarity in the meaning 
of particular terms, it is subject to parol 
evidence as to what the parties intended with 
respect to those terms. Faulkner v. Farnswo-
rth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983). Set also 
Rainier National Bank v. Inland Machinery 
Co., 29 Wash. App. 725, 631 P.2d 389 
(1981). We hold that that rule also applies 
where the character of the written agreement 
itself is ambiguous even though its specific 
terms are not ambiguous. Bown v. Loveland, 
678 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984); W.M. Barnes 
Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 
P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981); Hansen v. Kohlcr, 
550 P.2d 186, 188-89 (Utah 1976); Woods-
Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutheson-Ingram, 
642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981). 
Numerous factors bear on determining 
whether the terms of an agreement show that 
it was meant to be a lease or a security agree-
ment. Among others, those factors are 
whether (1) the lessor is a financier, (2) the 
lessee is required to insure the goods in favor 
of the lessor, (3) the lessee bears the risk of 
loss or damage, (4) the lessee is to pay the 
taxes, repairs, and maintenance, (5) the agre-
ement establishes default provisions gover-
ning acceleration and resale, (6) a substantial 
nonrefundable deposit is required, (7) the 
goods are to be selected from a third party by 
the lessee, (8) the rental payments were equi-
valent to the costs of the goods plus interest, 
(9) the lessor lacks facilities to store or retake 
the goods, (10) the lease may be discounted 
with a bank, (11) the warranties usually 
found in leases are omitted, and (12) the 
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goods or fixtures are impractical to remove. Christine M. Durham, Justice 
J White 8c R. Summers, Handbook of the Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code, Howe, Justice, concurs in the result. 
at 882-83 (2d ed. 1980). To the extent the ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
above factors are terms of the lease agree- ' 
ment, their probativeness will depend in some » 
instances on how they are phrased. 
Many of these factors are present in this 
lease. Under the lease, Larsen was to select 
the equipment and choose what supplier 
Colonial would obtain it from. All warranties 
by Colonial were excluded. Larsen was requ-
ired to insure the crawler-loader in favor of 
Colonial and to pay all taxes. He also bore 
the risk of loss. The lease contained default 
provisions governing acceleration and resale. 
The trial judge in this case did not address 
what these provisions indicated as to the 
intent of the parties or whether the terms 
were ambiguous, therefore necessitating the 
admission of parol evidence to ascertain the 
intent of the parties. 
Larsen relies heavily on FMA Financial 
Corp. v, Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 
1979), for the proposition that the oral evid-
ence should have been admitted in this case. 
FMA recognizes that despite an integration 
clause in the form lease involved in that case, 
the lease was in fact a sale. At trial, FMA 
admitted that it routinely offered lessees an 
option to purchase the equipment at the end 
of the lease term. The Court held that this 
admission rendered the integration clause 
ineffective and that the oral evidence was 
admissible. In any event, the agreement in 
this case, for an oral option, if any, is not 
inconsistent with the express terms of the 
agreement. Although no such admission has 
been made in the present case, appellant has 
alleged an oral option consistent with indu-
stry custom and trade in the affidavits, and 
that is sufficient to create an issue of fact. 
Only when contract terms are complete, 
clear, and unambiguous can they be interpr-
eted by the judge on a motion for summary 
judgment. Morris v. Mountain States Telep-
hone & Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 
(Utah 1983). If the evidence as to the terms 
of an agreement is in conflict, the intent of 
the parties as to the terms of the agreement is 
to be determined by the jury. Id.; Amjacs 
Intentest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 
53, 55 (Utah 1981). In sum, whether a lease 
was intended as security for a sale is a ques-
tion to be determined on the facts of each 
case, as is the issue of whether the nature of 
the document raises questions of fact that 
preclude summary judgment. FMA Financial 
Corp.. 590P.2dat805. 
Reversed and remanded. Costs to appel-
lant. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
